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Abstract: We use a natural field experiment to investigate the hypothesis that generosity is 
partly involuntary, by examining whether individuals tend to avoid opportunities to act 
generously. In Sweden, new recycling machines for bottles and cans with an option of 
donating the returned deposit to charity were gradually introduced in one of the largest store 
chains. We find a substantial decline in recycling the month these new machines were 
introduced and a further decline in the following months. These results indicate that 
individuals avoid opportunities to act generously and corroborate findings from both lab and 
field studies supporting the claim that generous behavior is partly involuntary.   
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1 Introduction 
Evidence of generous behavior towards others exists in a variety of situations in our daily 
lives, ranging from donating to charities to doing voluntary work and simply helping others. 
Recent empirical studies, however, have highlighted that generosity may be both voluntary 
and involuntary (Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; DellaVigna et 
al., 2012). For example, rather than voluntarily donating or helping others for the pleasure of 
doing so, one might donate or help due to social pressure and thus the action is at least partly 
involuntary.1
 
 In such instances, observed generous behavior comes at a cost for the 
individual, and presumably, she would be willing to pay in order to avoid interactions where 
she expects she would behave generously.  
In a laboratory setting, Dana et al. (2006) investigate the issue of voluntary vs. involuntary 
generosity by using a modified dictator game. In a standard dictator game, the subject 
assigned the role of dictator (sender) is asked to split a monetary endowment between herself 
and another subject (receiver). Commonly, dictators donate on average 20% of their 
endowment to the recipient (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2008). In the 
modified dictator game by Dana et al. (2006), dictators were allowed to opt out of the dictator 
game; while performing a non-related task, half of the subjects were randomly assigned the 
role of dictator. The dictators got the information about a standard dictator game and made 
allocation decisions. After their answers had been collected, they were informed about the 
opt-out possibility. However, this possibility came at a cost; if a dictator decided to opt out, 
she received a fixed payment corresponding to a reduction of the endowment by 10 percent. 
Importantly, dictators were informed that the receivers they had been matched with would not 
                                                          
1 This “involuntary” terminology is consistent with the literature (e.g., Broberg et al., 2007) and is intended to 
reflect that individuals prefer to avoid the opportunity to behave generously. Once presented with such an 
opportunity, however, people act generously. Anticipating this, individuals take measures to avoid such 
opportunities, giving rise to the “involuntary” interpretation of generous behavior and the associated 
terminology. 
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be told about the dictator game if they decided to opt out. Thus, to avoid a situation with a 
possibility to act generously, the dictator could pay a price, while the design ensures that the 
recipient does not form expectations about the dictator’s allocation decision. The authors 
found that 28% of subjects chose the opt-out option. 
 
To more directly explore the hypothesis that involuntary generosity is driven by the receiver’s 
expectations, Dana et al. (2006) conducted a second study. Besides replicating their first 
aforementioned study, they conducted a second dictator game with another sample of the 
subjects and they refer this game as the “private condition.” In this study, the receiver would 
not be told from where the money originated, compared to the other experiment where they 
obtained complete information about the origin of the money if the sender decided not to opt-
out. In the replication study, the proportion of subjects opting out when the receiver did not 
know the origin of the money was now only 4% (private condition) compared to 43% when 
the recipient was informed of the dictator game, replicating the result obtained in the first 
study (28%) with complete information. These results indicate that donations are at least 
partly involuntarily since the proportion of subjects opting-out decreased significantly when 
information about the origin of the money would not be revealed to the receiver. In a follow-
up study, Broberg et al. (2007) conducted a study similar to the first study by Dana et al. 
(2006). Instead of having a fixed cost of opting out, they used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism to determine the reservation price, and found that the reservation price averaged a 
reduction of 18% of the endowment. In addition, Lazear et al. (2012) found that 33-41% 
chose the opt-out option in a dictator game similar to that of Dana et al. (2006) with complete 
information. Taken together, these results support the idea that people dislike letting down the 
expectations of others as they are willing to incur costs to avoid giver-receiver interactions.  
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Consistent results are attained by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), who in another type of 
modified dictator game informed dictators that their chosen amount would be given to the 
receiver only with a certain probability, while otherwise an amount randomly chosen from a 
pre-specified distribution would be given to the receiver. Their results show a significant link 
between the amount given and the probability that the amount chosen by the dictator would 
actually be given to the receiver. These results too indicate a link between the expectations of 
the receiver and the generous behavior of the dictator, and are consistent with the 
interpretation that generosity is to some extent involuntary.2
 
 If people are aware of these 
effects on their own behavior, prospective givers might take measures to avoid giver-receiver 
interactions.   
Two recent field experiments have focused on generous behavior and the possibility that 
generous acts may be involuntary. Andreoni et al. (2011) conducted a charity collection 
experiment at a supermarket where collectors were standing at some but not all exits of the 
supermarket. This is a similar to the study by Dana et al. (2006) as subjects at a cost, i.e., 
choosing another exit, can avoid passing the collector, thinking the collector will not know 
that the individual has avoided the interaction (opted out). By observing people as they exit, 
Andreoni et al. (2011) find that people take alternative and longer routes when exiting a 
supermarket to avoid being asked to donate to charity. Moreover, they find that donation rates 
increase for those who are asked, which may be the reason for avoiding the interaction.3
                                                          
2 It is harder for the receiver to blame the dictator if she does not know with certainty the cause of her potentially 
low donation, and consequently, the dictator perhaps does not have to feel as guilty; see, e.g., Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007; 2009) regarding guilt and belief-dependent motivation.  
 
DellaVigna et al. (2012) use a door-to-door experiment where the residents are informed via a 
flyer delivered the day before a solicitor’s visit about the time of solicitation. Their design 
3 This finding is consistent with experimental results. Dictator games involving communication between the 
dictators and the receivers have shown that communication is powerful enough to increase giving (e.g., Andreoni 
and Rao, 2011). Hoffman et al. (1996) also show that donations tend to decrease with social distance.  
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allows the household members to avoid the solicitor if they wish to do so. Indeed, they find 
that when solicitation was accompanied by the flyer, people opened the door less than without 
the flyers, leading to a reduction in donations compared to when solicitors turned up 
unannounced. Moreover, when residents are given a flyer with a “do-not-disturb” option, 
giving is further reduced, indicating that people are aware they will have a hard time saying 
no when face-to-face with the solicitor, or at least find the interaction uncomfortable, and then 
take measures to avoid it. Thus, the tendencies to avoid the giver-receiver interaction in these 
field experiments are consistent with the findings from dictator games with an option to opt 
out.  
 
This paper investigates opt-out behavior in a natural field experiment. In particular, we 
investigate how the recycling of beverage containers with a deposit was affected when 
recycling machines with the option to donate the refund to a charity rather than obtaining cash 
was introduced in Sweden. Since 1984, a deposit system for cans and bottles has been in place 
in the country. The deposit system initially included only aluminum cans, but has successively 
been extended to also include glass and PET bottles of different sizes.4 Cans, glass and PET 
bottles can be deposited at most grocery stores and supermarkets in recycling machines. Since 
the mid-2000s, an additional button has gradually been added to the recycling machines 
providing an opportunity to donate the returned deposit to charity.5
 
 Thus, in stores with 
machines equipped with this button, individuals face a choice of whether or not to donate 
each time they recycle their cans and bottles. It should be noted that apart from the donation 
option, the main features of the machines remain the same.   
                                                          
4 The abbreviation PET refers to bottles made of the recyclable material polyethylene terephthalate. 
5 See Figure A1 in the appendix for an image of the donation and return deposit buttons. 
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Individuals who would like to opt out from the donation opportunity can decide to either not 
recycle at all or bring their cans and bottles to another store where the machines do not have a 
donation button. This situation, therefore, closely resembles that which has been tested in the 
laboratory through the modified dictator games described earlier, as individuals, after the 
introduction of the donation option, can at some cost avoid the situation where they have an 
opportunity to behave generously. Again, not all chains have recycling machines with 
donation possibilities, and those chains that do have introduced them gradually, making it 
possible to avoid the machines equipped with donation buttons and recycle elsewhere. This 
provides an opportunity to investigate whether people actively avoid the donation opportunity 
by comparing the recycled amount before and after the button was introduced.   
 
2 Natural field experimental  
In Sweden, there is a required deposit on beverage cans and bottles. There are three broad 
types of containers – aluminum cans, PET bottles, and glass bottles – and they are all included 
in the deposit system. A deposit, the size of which varies depending on the type of container, 
is paid by the consumer at the time of purchase and then refunded when the container is 
returned to a recycling machine at a grocery store. The overall return rate of containers is 
about 90% (Returpack, 2012).  
 
At the beginning of 2006, Kooperativa Förbundet (KF), which is one of the largest grocery 
retail chains in Sweden, began to replace old recycling machines without any possibility to 
donate with new machines with donation possibilities. Donations made in these machines 
benefit the organizations Viskogen (“Our forest”) and Kooperation utan gränser 
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(“Cooperation without borders/limits”).6
 
 At the end of each month, the total amount donated 
in all KF stores is split equally between these two organizations.  
KF is a cooperative that is owned by its members (currently about 3 million out of the 9 
million people living in Sweden), yet the stores are open to anybody.7 Many of the decisions 
within KF are decentralized to its 44 consumer societies, including the introduction of 
recycling machines with a possibility to donate. Each consumer society covers substantially 
different geographical areas of Sweden and the number of stores in a society varies from 1 to 
73. The decision to adopt a machine with a donation option is made by the board of the 
consumer society, which consists of the store owners.8 Once a society has decided to 
introduce recycling machines with a donation option, the replacement at store level takes 
place when an older machine breaks or is no longer worthwhile to maintain, i.e., the 
introduction is exogenous. From 2006 when the first machines with donation possibilities 
were introduced to 2010, the fraction of stores with the new type of machines steadily 
increased from 26% to 76%.9
 
   
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of introducing a recycling machine with 
a donation option on recycling behavior. We analyze how much the monetary value of the 
amount recycled has changed from before to after the introduction of the new machines. Since 
recycling is cyclical and depends on time of the year, and machines are introduced at different 
times of the year, we chose to 12-month difference the monthly monetary values of the 
                                                          
6 The charities are Viskogen, which focuses on forestry projects in Africa (see Viskogen, 2012), and Kooperation 
utan gränser, which focusses on rural development projects in Africa and Latin America (see Kooperation utan 
gränser, 2012). 
7 The benefits of being a member are weekly discounts on certain products and dividends from profit in relation 
to amount purchased.   
8 It is possible that if a consumer society consists of very few stores, adoption of new machines can depend on 
preferences of individual store owners. It should, however, be noted that our results do not depend on inclusion 
or exclusion of these stores.  
9 Note that a few stores in our sample were either bought, opened, or closed during the time period surrounding 
the introduction of the button (12 months) required for our analysis.  
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returned deposits. This is then estimated in relation to the month when the new machine was 
introduced, controlling for store effect, calendar month, and year. Thus, we estimate the 
following model: 
20116 12
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where ity∆  is the change in month t from the introduction of the new machine compared to 
the amount recycled in month t the year before. We control for time-invariant effects by 
introducing dummies for store (αi) and for time-variant effects by introducing dummies for 
year (Yearj) and calendar month (Monthk) effects using a fixed effect model approach. Tit is a 
dummy variable indicating the time t from when the button was introduced in store i. It is 
used to measure the behavioral effect before and after introducing the machine. We choose to 
use a dummy variable approach for flexibility reasons since it does not require imposition of a 
specific time trend as would, for example, assuming a linear time effect. The months we 
included range from -5 (five months before the donation option was introduced) to 6 (six 
months after). The reference month in the regression is the month before the donation option 
was introduced, i.e., t = -1. Thus, by choosing this month as reference, we can easily test 
whether there was any change or adjustment before the introduction, as well as the immediate 
effect of introducing the machine. It should be noted that we do not know when during a 
month the new machine was installed, and hence when any potential behavioral effect began. 
Thus, we might expect a weak effect on behavior during the first month. We test the 
following explicit hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: No change in monthly recycling behavior after the introduction of the donation 
option:  
 1 0tβ = = , 2 0tβ = = , 3 0tβ = = , 4 0tβ = = , 5 0tβ = = , 6 0tβ = = . 
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Hypothesis 2:  No overall change in monthly recycling behavior after the introduction of the 
donation option: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0t t t t t tβ β β β β β= = = = = == = = = = = . 
 
Hypothesis 3: No change in monthly recycling behavior between the months after the 
introduction of the donation option: 
, 1,..,6, 1,..,6,t j t k j k j kβ β= == = = ∀ ≠ . 
 
The data on amount recycled is reported for three different types of containers: i) 0.33 liter 
aluminum cans (Cans), for which the deposit was SEK 0.5 for the studied period; (ii) 0.5 liter 
PET bottles with a deposit of SEK 1 (PET 1), and; (iii) 1.5 liter PET bottles with a deposit of 
SEK 2 (PET 2).10 In total, we have complete recycling data for all stores in the grocery retail 
chain for the 12 months surrounding the time of introduction of a machine and the year before 
for 183 stores for Cans, 186 for PET1, and 188 for PET2 during the period 2005-2010.11
 
   
3 Results 
To investigate the effect of introducing a machine with a donation option on recycling, we ran 
a fixed effects regression model as described above both for the pooled data of all container 
types and for each container type (Cans, PET1 and PET2) separately, with 12-month-
differenced monetary deposit value as dependent variable. Table 1 presents our main 
regression results. 
 
                                                          
10 Recycled glass bottles are handled by a separate recycling machine and company, and this data is not available 
to us. 
11 The data was obtained from COOP and Returpack, which is the recycling company responsible for the 
recycling at KF. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
In the regression models, the reference month is the month before the machine was 
introduced. The first model in Table 1 shows differences in the total monetary amount 
recycled for all containers. We find that the months before the introduction of the new 
machine do not significantly differ from the reference month, i.e., the month just before the 
introduction of the new machine, at the 5% significance level. In the overall test of whether 
all months before the introduction are the same, we cannot reject the hypothesis at the 5% 
level, indicating that people do not seem to change their behavior before the machine is 
actually introduced. However, for the month when the new machine is introduced as well as 
for each of the months thereafter, we can reject Hypothesis 1, i.e., no change in recycling 
behavior, at the 1% significance level. We can also reject Hypothesis 2, i.e., no overall change 
in recycling behavior after the introduction, at the 1% level. Table 2 shows the p-values of 
tests corresponding to Hypothesis 3 of no pairwise monthly effect on recycling behavior after 
the introduction of the machine. We find no significant effects between consecutive months at 
the 5% level, but we do find support for pairwise differences for non-consecutive months at 
the 5% level in approximately half of the cases. In sum, there seems to be an immediate 
change in behavior following an introduction of the donation option and an additional decline 
over time. 
 
In the remaining part of Table 1, we present the same analyses separated by cans and the two 
types of PET bottles. As in the case of total amount recycled, we can for each of the three 
container types reject Hypothesis 1, i.e., no change in recycling behavior, at the 1% 
significance level, but we cannot reject hypothesis 2, i.e., no overall change in recycling 
behavior during the next five months after introduction, at the 5% level. In the pair-wise tests 
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of Hypothesis 3, the results are similar to the case of total amount recycled (see Tables A1-A3 
in Appendix). As in the case of total amount recycled, there seems to be an immediate change 
in behavior following introduction of the donation option and an additional decline over time. 
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
4 Conclusions 
Using a natural field experiment, we investigated the hypothesis that generous behavior is in 
part involuntary. We analyzed the effect of the introduction of a donation option on recycling 
machines, where the returned deposit can be donated to charity. On machines that have the 
donation option installed, individuals face a choice of whether or not to donate every time 
they recycle cans and bottles. We find that the recycled amount is significantly lower already 
in the month when the button was installed and that there is a further decrease over time.  
 
Our results are consistent with those from the experimental laboratory where subjects have 
been willing to incur a cost in order to avoid playing the dictator game (Broberg et al., 2007; 
Dana et al., 2006). Our results are also in line with the field experimental findings by 
Andreoni et al. (2011), who find that asking people to donate increases donations but, aware 
of this, people take longer alternative routes when exiting a supermarket in order to avoid 
being asked to donate to charity. Similarly, DellaVigna et al. (2012) show that receiving a 
flyer from solicitors explaining that they will visit the next day makes people open their doors 
less and also that solicitor flyers with a “do-not-disturb” option further reduces giving. A body 
of evidence collected across a number of environments demonstrates that at least some 
individuals are reluctant givers, supporting the claim that generosity is in part involuntary. 
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Given the growing body of evidence from a number of studies, it is pertinent to ask how this 
avoidance behavior ought to be interpreted. Dana et al. (2006) argue that generosity is driven 
by a desire not to let down the expectations of the recipient. DellaVigna et al. (2012) support 
this interpretation and suggest that people might feel pressured to donate. These 
interpretations, in turn, find support in Andreoni and Rao (2011), who find that giver-receiver 
communication alone is sufficient to increase donations from the dictator to the recipient. 
They suggest that the act of asking for a certain donation might stimulate empathy or internal 
pressure in the dictator, but might also serve to signal expectations. Finally, in the case of 
collecting donations in the field, Andreoni et al. (2011) suggest that avoidance may reflect a 
lack of altruism or a self-control strategy used to avoid the empathetic impulse to donate.  
 
The results from our paper corroborate and validate results previously found in lab and field 
experiments. Our results lend support to the interpretation of generous behavior as partly 
being involuntary, and show that these motivations may have long-term effects on generous 
behavior. Further research is needed to investigate the psychological mechanisms that might 
lead to avoidance behavior, for example the effect of various degrees of public exposure in 
giver-receiver interactions. 
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Table 1. 12-month-differenced values of recycled commodities in SEK in the months 
surrounding introduction of the donation option on recycling machines.  
Model specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample: Pooled Cans PET 1 PET 2 
Dependent variable: Differenced value 
of deposits (SEK) 
Differenced value 
of deposits (SEK) 
Differenced value 
of deposits (SEK) 
Differenced value 
of deposits (SEK) 
Before introduction     
t = -5 3026.1 2625.0 381.8 21.09 
 (1.29) (1.40) (1.18) (0.09) 
t = -4 2836.9 2165.8 427.8* 245.5 
 (1.52) (1.43) (1.72) (1.45) 
t = -3 543.5 621.9 145.2 -161.7 
 (0.36) (0.52) (0.72) (-1.02) 
t = -2 800.3 576.4 313.1 2.185 
 (0.54) (0.54) (1.41) (0.01) 
After introduction     
t = 0 -5167.0*** -3845.9*** -642.1*** -643.9*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.84) (-3.35) (-3.52) 
t = 1 -5254.9*** -4427.1*** -608.1*** -341.1** 
 (-3.35) (-3.52) (-2.81) (-2.33) 
t = 2 -6645.5*** -5322.5*** -833.7*** -468.5*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.36) (-3.03) (-2.69) 
t = 3 -8535.1*** -6906.1*** -1122.0*** -689.4*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.44) (-3.20) (-2.98) 
t = 4 -11509.5*** -9183.6*** -1451.2*** -933.2*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.75) (-3.42) (-3.55) 
t = 5 -9993.1*** -8138.1*** -1212.5** -643.3** 
 (-2.77) (-2.81) (-2.47) (-2.16) 
t = 6 -12303.1*** -9852.2*** -1584.3*** -927.7*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.91) (-2.78) (-2.74) 
Calendar month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2196 2232 2256 2256 
R2 0.078 0.069 0.075 0.102 
Notes. t statistics in parentheses; * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01; Robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. P-values for pairwise tests of equality of coefficients based on regression (1): All 
containers. 
  t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
t=1 0.9494 
     t=2 0.3045 0.2142 
    t=3 0.0845 0.0152 0.0698 
   t=4 0.0075 0.0012 0.0004 0.0097 
  t=5 0.1053 0.0515 0.0724 0.3246 0.1698 
 t=6 0.0454 0.0186 0.0126 0.0593 0.6002 0.0278 
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Appendix 
Table A1. P-values for pairwise tests equality of coefficients based on regression (2): Cans. 
  t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
t=1 0.5645 
     t=2 0.1818 0.2830 
    t=3 0.0459 0.0183 0.0463 
   t=4 0.0045 0.0016 0.0003 0.0077 
  t=5 0.0684 0.0541 0.0556 0.2857 0.2013 
 t=6 0.0339 0.0230 0.0208  0.0608 0.5630 0.0281 
 
 
Table A2. P-values for pairwise tests equality of coefficients based on regression (3): PET1. 
  t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
t=1 0.8732 
     t=2 0.3935 0.1849 
    t=3 0.0891 0.0114 0.0880 
   t=4 0.0183  0.0020 0.0026 0.0613 
  t=5 0.1780 0.0709 0.1595 0.6730 0.1553 
 t=6 0.0581 0.0158 0.0271 0.0943  0.5358 0.0160 
 
 
Table A3. P-values for pairwise tests equality of coefficients based on regression (4): PET2. 
  t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
t=1 0.1221 
     t=2 0.2670 0.4024 
    t=3 0.8319 0.0374 0.1116 
   t=4 0.1834 0.0040 0.0019  0.1057 
  t=5 0.9984 0.2014 0.3481 0.7848 0.0765 
 t=6 0.3669 0.0289 0.0402 0.2204 0.9762 0.0627 
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Figure A1. Photo of the recycling machine with the deposit return option (Pantknappen) and 
the donation option (Biståndsknappen). 
 
Note: The left-hand button “Pantknappen” is the deposit return option. The text below reads: 
“Press here to receive your deposit receipt.” The right hand button “Biståndsknappen” is the 
donation option, which reads: “Press here and help families in poor countries with your 
deposit.”  
